Have you noticed that once again Kinshasa has shifted its narrative, admitting for the first time that Congo’s crisis is primarily internal rather than the result of foreign aggression?
The regime’s spokesperson, Patrick Muyaya, went on TV insisting with a straight face that the Washington peace deal can only be implemented if the Doha process, which is a direct negotiation between Kinshasa and the M23, succeeds.
Why does this matter?
Because whether he knows it or not, Muyaya just contradicted the regime’s entire messaging after the Washington peace deal was signed. Back then, Kinshasa was adamant: the crisis was over. They had signed peace with what Kigali, which they constantly smear as “the aggressor.” Logically, there was no reason to talk with Rwanda’s “proxy.”
For Tshisekedi, the international community had to buy into four fictions:
First, that the FDLR? Nonexistent, or too weak to matter, just a pretext for foreign aggression.
Secondly that the crisis is “a foreign invasion”, violating Congolese territorial integrity.
Thirdly that Rwanda was or is “looting Congolese minerals.”
And lastly that the M23 is a “puppet on Kigali’s strings”, or “an empty shell propped up by Rwandan troops.”
But when it came time to negotiate, the entire narrative fell apart.
The Washington peace deal explicitly recognized the FDLR as a serious threat that had to be dismantled before Rwanda’s “defensive measures” could be lifted. By signing it, Kinshasa essentially admitted Rwanda was the aggrieved party acting defensively.
At the table, Kinshasa also abandoned the “mineral looting” narrative. Instead, it signed on to the Regional Economic Integration Framework, which simply formalizes reality: Congo’s minerals naturally transit through Rwanda and other neighbors. It is Congo’s job, not Rwanda’s, to restore state authority and make sure minerals are properly documented. Rwanda can cooperate, but the responsibility lies with Kinshasa.
Heading into Doha, Kinshasa implicitly acknowledged that the M23 is not Kigali’s puppet but a Congolese political-military movement with its own agenda. The talks even involved discussions on how to integrate M23 fighters into Congo’s security forces, an admission that these are Congolese fighters, not foreign troops. At this point, what’s left of Kinshasa’s war narrative?
Muyaya has now made it clear: lasting peace hinges on the success of inter-Congolese dialogue in Doha. And how could it be otherwise? For the first time, Kinshasa is admitting that this crisis is, first and foremost, internal.
What remains is a smear campaign, alleged massacres, threats of sanctions, desperate attempts to weaken the other side at the table. But that is not strategy, that is flailing. Lies do not last.
