Burundi stands alone. Within the East African Community (EAC), it is the only member state still backing Kinshasa’s belligerence against the AFC/M23, while the rest of the region is advocating dialogue over escalation. Even within SADC, key powers have either refused to join the fray, Angola and Zimbabwe have kept their distance, or have withdrawn their troops, as South Africa did.
In hindsight, Burundi’s leadership has made one disastrous choice after another on the regional chessboard. The EAC and SADC are moving in different directions, changing course as the realities on the ground shift. Burundi, however, remains stubbornly fixed on a path that leads nowhere except toward its own destabilisation.
Lest we forget, by hitching its wagon to Kinshasa’s failing war effort, Burundi is creating enemies on all sides. It joined the conflict under the pretext of regional security cooperation, but has since become a partner in a genocidal campaign against Congolese Tutsi, who now stand just across Burundi’s western borders. Worse, it has allied itself with the FDLR, a United Nations and United States-sanctioned terrorist group and Kigali’s mortal enemy.
Should Kinshasa ever make peace with the AFC/M23 and neutralise the FDLR, Burundi will find itself isolated and exposed. It will have burned bridges with Rwanda, alienated its own neighbours, especially the Banyamulenge community, distanced itself from regional partners, and gained nothing in return.
The domestic fallout is already visible. Burundian soldiers are angry and demoralised. The death toll in Congo is mounting, and economic hardship at home is worsening. Soldiers’ families are left without support, salaries remain unpaid, and the public is growing restless. The spectre of social unrest, or even a coup, is no longer far-fetched. Officers on the ground have openly voiced their frustration, warning that mutiny is possible if the war continues.
Beyond the army, Burundi’s attacks on the AFC/M23 and its alliance with the FDLR invite countermeasures. Supporting genocidaires while fighting a popular Congolese movement is a recipe for blowback. Whatever stability Burundi currently enjoys could unravel if the conflict spills back across its borders.
The question is no longer whether Burundi’s alignment with Kinshasa will backfire, but whether it will change course before it is too late. The costs of this war, human, economic, and diplomatic, are piling up. If the regime in Gitega does not recalibrate soon, it may find that the war it thought it was fighting in Congo comes home to roost.
