The east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced insecurity for more than three decades, with over 260 armed groups operating in the restive region. Many of these groups receive support from the Congolese regime, which has historically showed no efforts to neutralize armed militias.
Among them, the FDLR, a terrorist group formed by remnants of the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, remains highly active. Decades of government’s inaction have made the genocidaires nearly impossible to eliminate, giving them a level of operational and political entrenchment that Tshisekedi now relies upon.
Despite overwhelming evidence, Kinshasa has long denied collaborating with the FDLR. Yet in late March, General Ychaligonza Jacques, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army (FARDC), declared that the regime would hunt down FDLR terrorists and repatriate them to Rwanda for further management. This raises questions about whether the Tshisekedi regime will truly act or if this is another symbolic act, consistent with Kinshasa’s pattern of performative announcements regarding the genocidal militia.
FDLR’S central role in the persecution of Congolese Tutsis. In November 2022, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, the then UN’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, raised concerns about attacks against the Kinyarwanda-speaking community in eastern DRC based on “ethnicity or perceived allegiance with neighboring countries.” These systematic killings are orchestrated by FDLR under the watch of the Congolese government.
A June 2024 UN report revealed that Kinshasa increasingly relies on the FDLR to fight AFC/M23 rebels, thereby escalating conflict and chaos in the east.
Tshisekedi’s refusal to dismantle FDLR has proven to be ideologically driven, as he shares the group’s hostility toward the Tutsi. Since assuming office seven years ago, hate speech and violence targeting excluded Congolese Tutsi communities, Hema, and Banyamulenge whom he portrays as foreigners have intensified. The FDLR has burned homes, destroyed property, and at times brutally killed Congolese Tutsi with machetes or hoes.
Tshisekedi’s alignment with this ideology reinforces his political control over the region, making the maintenance of the militia both a strategic military asset and an ideological tool.
Tshisekedi resists dismantling FDLR because he views them as a stronger fighting force than his poorly managed, undisciplined, and corrupt army. He relies on the militia to maintain control over eastern DRC, and FDLR further consolidates its influence by training allied armed groups, including Wazalendo, Nyatura to engage M23 rebels, embedding itself deeply within the broader military landscape.
Tshisekedi has gone so far as to integrate elements of the FDLR into the Republican Guard, further embedding the militia within his security apparatus and making any attempt at dismantling operationally complex.
It is an open secret that Tshisekedi actively refuses to dismantle FDLR as part of his broader plan to destabilize Rwanda. He works with the militia against M23 forces, promising control over the latter’s-held areas along the Rwandan border to support and facilitate the genocidaires’ incursions in its campaign to pursue “regime change in Kigali” should the operation succeed.
The same approach is further driven by his hostility toward Rwanda over its alleged presence in eastern DRC, reinforcing his willingness to retain and deploy the FDLR as a proxy force. Dismantling the group would therefore not only weaken his domestic authority but also undermine his regional strategy.
The consequences of this alliance are severe. In September 2019, the FDLR attacked civilians in Kinigi, Rwanda, with knives and rudimentary weapons. In June 2022, rockets fired from eastern DRC struck Rwanda’s Musanze District, while repeated violations of Rwandan airspace by Congolese Sukhoi-25 jets prompted multiple warnings from Kigali. In January 2025, artillery shells from FARDC/FDLR-led operations including FDLR fighters hit Rubavu District, killing 16 civilians, injuring 177, and destroying over 200 homes.
Dismantling FDLR is entirely possible, as the Congolese authorities know the members of this militia and their locations, which could bring relative peace to the region. However, for Tshisekedi, losing the FDLR would be a crippling blow like losing his right arm. Their entrenched presence, strategic value, military integration, shared hostility toward Congolese Tutsi, and role as leverage against Rwanda make them indispensable to both his domestic control and regional ambitions.
Until a decisive action is taken, Kinshasa’s declarations against FDLR and allied genocidaires will remain largely symbolic.
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