When the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed the Washington Agreement, it committed itself to one of the most important security obligations in the peace process: the neutralization of the FDLR. The accompanying Concept of Operations (CONOPS) clearly outlines this objective, leaving no room for ambiguity.
Yet months later, Kinshasa’s actions and public communications suggest it has no intention of honouring its commitments, or heeding Washington’s calls to neutralise the genocidal group that lies at the heart of tensions with Kigali.
Since the signing of the Washington Agreement, the Tshisekedi administration has repeatedly shifted its narrative on the FDLR. At times, Kinshasa has claimed the group no longer exists. At other times, it has dismissed it as a mere pretext used by Rwanda, implying that it no longer poses a security threat. On some occasions, Congolese officials have insisted that the FDLR operates exclusively in territories beyond government control; on others, they have admitted to collaboration with the group, calling on their own soldiers to end such ties and claiming to be conducting sensitisation campaigns to encourage FDLR members to surrender peacefully.
More recently, Congolese officials have gone directly against the spirit of the President Donald Trump-brokered peace deal, insisting that they would only proceed with the military operations envisaged by the CONOPS once Rwanda had lifted its defensive measures, only to reverse course and claim that military operations were no longer necessary because the group had agreed to surrender and disband.
However, contradictory these narratives may be, they share a common thread: they are all justifications for Kinshasa’s refusal to implement the Washington Accords.
The latest claim, that Kinshasa and the genocidal outfit have signed a protocol for peaceful surrender, is the clearest evidence yet of this pattern.
Consider this. For FDLR members who choose voluntary repatriation, established procedures have long existed. Individuals wishing to return to Rwanda have traditionally done so through MONUSCO, following internationally recognised repatriation protocols. This process has been used for years and has facilitated the return of tens of thousands of former FDLR members.
This raises an important question: if mechanisms for voluntary and peaceful surrender already exist, what additional “protocols” is Kinshasa referring to when it claims to have signed agreements with the FDLR?
This appears to be Kinshasa’s attempt to bring its ally, the FDLR, to the negotiating table, a proposal Kigali has always rejected, and with good reason. The Washington framework explicitly provides for the neutralisation of that terror outfit, not its recognition as a political negotiating partner.
Many observers have long warned that Kinshasa would be neither willing nor able to honour its commitments. One explanation often advanced is that the FDLR has, over many years, become deeply intertwined with Congolese state structures. As a result, eradicating the FDLR is no longer a straightforward military exercise.
Over time, the movement has also dispersed, reconstituted itself, and blended into local communities. Identifying its members, separating them from civilian populations, and dismantling entrenched networks has become significantly more complex than it might have been years ago.
Whether this complexity explains the delays or not, it does not alter the commitment that was made under the Washington Agreement. If Kinshasa was unable but willing to implement the peace deal, it would say so, and surely there would be actors willing to help rid the region of this genocidal group.
Instead, the Tshisekedi administration has done little more than signal its intent to disregard the peace treaty. Washington may choose to look the other way and accept the rebuff to its pressure, but it is unlikely that Kigali, the other party to the peace deal, will sit idle while Kinshasa is reportedly increasing support for the genocidal group. Something will eventually give.
Ultimately, peace agreements are measured not by the promises made at the signing table, but by their implementation. As long as the commitment to neutralise the FDLR remains unfulfilled, no lasting peace is possible in the Great Lakes region.
