Today in Washington, the United States opens a major ministerial meeting on critical minerals, convened by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The meet brings together governments from across the world, with the purpose “to review global supply chains” and to “discuss how to secure future access to the minerals that power modern industries.”
The discussions are focused on how countries can cooperate to stabilize mineral supply chains, attract investment, and address challenges affecting production and transport, especially at a time when competition over resources described as essential for energy transition, and for advanced technologies is intensifying worldwide.
More than 50 countries were invited to participate, including several African states that are central to global mineral production such as Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. All are seen as major players in supplying copper, cobalt and other strategic materials needed by Western economies seeking to diversify away from dependence on a few dominant suppliers.
However, from the viewed list of invited countries, Rwanda seems not to feature despite signing recently a significant minerals cooperation agreement with DRC under US patronage. It is also on record that the country has increasingly positioned itself as a regional processing and logistics hub for mineral exports.
To be clear, missing one meeting is not a diplomatic crisis. Rwanda does not measure its relevance by attendance lists, and invitations or exclusions alone do not determine economic or political standing.
But context matters, especially given the persistent narrative pushed by authorities in Kinshasa that “Rwanda’s mineral sector exists mainly through the alleged plundering of Congolese resources,” a claim that is devoid of truth and repeated often enough in international forums to risk becoming accepted without scrutiny.
Truth of the matter is that geological reality is less convenient. The mineral-rich belt that runs through eastern Congo extends into Rwanda, meaning both countries sit on related formations producing tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, even if Congo’s reserves in cobalt and copper might be larger in scale. But that is also subject to scrutiny because none has ever measured potential reserves.
Washington’s current engagement seems to view Rwanda primarily through a regional stability and transit lens rather than as a direct critical mineral supplier. Under the broader 2025 Washington Accords framework, Rwanda’s role is increasingly linked to peace implementation, economic integration and efforts to curb smuggling and illicit mineral flows in eastern Congo. Obviously there is the additional value Rwanda brings, through refining.
The result is that producer countries attending the Washington forum stand to benefit from investment matchmaking, framework agreements and supply-chain partnerships.
This dynamic reflects a wider geopolitical calculation shaping global mineral diplomacy.
The United States is seeking to secure resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on dominant suppliers, placing countries with large mineral reserves at the center of negotiations, even when governance and security risks remain high.
In this process configuration, Congo gains near-term economic advantages tied to US-backed reforms and investment frameworks, while Rwanda’s economic positioning becomes indirectly tied to peace implementation in a conflict environment it does not control alone, creating an unfair imbalance.
Washington must therefore ensure its policies do not unintentionally reinforce misleading narratives or create wrong perceptions. Regional economic integration depends on cooperation rather than competition between neighbors.
Because in the long run, minerals alone do not secure prosperity.
Stable nations do.
Leave a Reply